Renewable Electricity Policy and Market Integration
In: IFN Working Paper No. 968
26 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: IFN Working Paper No. 968
SSRN
Working paper
This is a game-theoretic analysis of the link between regime type and international conflict. The democratic electorate can credibly punish the leader for bad conflict outcomes, whereas the autocratic selectorate cannot. For the fear of being thrown out of office, democratic leaders are (i) more selective about the wars they initiate and (ii) on average win more of the wars they start. Foreign policy behaviour is found to display strategic complementarities. The likelihood of interstate war, therefore, is lowest in the democratic dyad (pair), highest in the autocratic dyad with the mixed dyad in between. The results are consistent with empirical findings.
BASE
In: Economics of Governance, Band 10, Heft 2
SSRN
Working paper
In: ENEECO-D-22-00795
SSRN
In: RESEN-D-23-00253
SSRN
In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 45, Heft 3, S. 645-673
ISSN: 1756-2171
I generalize the workhorse model of network competition to include income effects in demand. Empirical work has shown income effects to be positive and statistically significant. Income effects deliver theoretical results consistent with regulatory concern about excessive termination rates: unregulated network operators competing in nondiscriminatory retail contracts negotiate termination rates above cost for any positive income effect. This also holds when operators discriminate between on‐net and off‐net calls if networks are differentiated. Operators profit from increasing termination rates above cost under second‐degree price discrimination if a sufficient share of consumers prefer on‐net/off‐net contracts and their subscription demand is relatively inelastic.
This paper presents a model of strategic positioning during an election campagin in which candidates use results from opinion polls to extract information about voter preferences. It is shown that the distance between policy announcements decreases over the course of the campaign: candidates announce initial policies at either extreme of the political spectrum and commit to moderate final policies. An underdog effect arises: the difference in candidate popularity decreases as the campaign evolves. A public opinion poll constitutes a Pareto improvement if final policies are expected to become more moderate after the introduction of the poll.
BASE
In: Journal of international economics, Band 131, S. 103433
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP14480
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Journal of Industrial Economics, Band 66, Heft 4, S. 904-941
SSRN
We analyze the optimal design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that compensate foreign investors against host country policies. Optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation (""regulatory chill""). The incentives to form agreements and their distributional consequences depend on countries' unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment flows. Foreign investors benefit from agreements between developed countries at the expense of the rest of society, but not in the case of agreements between developed and developing countries.
BASE
In: IFN Working Paper No. 1191
SSRN
Working paper
In: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper No. RSCAS 2017/19
SSRN
Working paper
This paper investigates the design and implications of international investment agreements. These are ubiquitous, potent and heavily criticized state-to-state treaties that protect foreign investment against host country policies. We show that optimal agreements cause national but not global underregulation ("regulatory chill"). The incentives to form agreements and their distributional consequences depend on countries' unilateral commitment possibilities and the direction of investment flows. The benefits from agreements between developed countries accrue to foreign investors at the expense of the rest of society, but this is not the case for agreements between developed and developing countries.
BASE